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Executive Summary 
In 2015, Europe experienced the largest influx of refugees since the Balkan wars in the early 1990s. 
While arrivals are down in 2016, the security situation in the Middle East and the instability in North 
Africa and elsewhere mean that Europe will play host to refugees for the foreseeable future.  
Quite apart from the considerable humanitarian issues at stake, this commands European countries – 
both out of self-interest and in the interest of refugees – to facilitate wider societal integration. Labour 
market integration of newcomers plays a key role in achieving this objective. 
In this study, we trace the integration experience of Bosnian refugees from the Balkan wars to draw 
lessons for the current wave of refugees. Integration is a slow-moving process. Looking closely at 
Bosnian refugees enables us to see past immediate integration outcomes and take a longer-term view. 
Another consideration is that there is significant overlap among countries affected by the two refugee 
crises. Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden all saw a large absolute and relative 
influx of refugees in both 2015 and between 1992 and 1995, when the bulk of Bosnians arrived in 
Western Europe. We study their labour market integration in depth in those five countries. 
Taking such a long-term perspective is not without its problems. Comparable data sources are missing 
and countries differ in the extent to which former refugees can be identified subsequently. We 
overcome this by surveying both national and international language sources, and combing through 
the dispersed information available. One early insight emerges from this work: Internationally, there 
is a need for much better long-term tracking of immigrants in order to analyse their experiences and 
draw conclusions for policy. 
A number of findings emerge from our study that merit attention: 
 Overall, for the countries studied, the integration of Bosnians has been a success.  
 Under favourable integration policies and labour market conditions, employment rates reach 
those of the native population in little more than a decade. 
 Granting the right to work quickly upon arrival is important, but failing to do so can still lead 
to good long-term labour market outcomes.  
 Initial unemployment levels in host countries are important, but again, need not inhibit labour 
market integration in the longer term. 
 Second-generation Bosnians, or those who arrived at a young age, perform roughly on a par 
with native-born cohorts. We deem this to be a sign of a completed integration process. 
Bosnians were generally better educated than other refugees. This may have played a role in their 
successful integration, and has implications for expectations regarding the integration of recent Syrian 
arrivals. 
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Labour Market Integration of Refugees 
A comparative survey of Bosnians in five EU countries 
Mikkel Barslund, Matthias Busse, Karolien Lenaerts, Lars Ludolph 
and Vilde Renman* 
CEPS Special Report No. 155/December 2016 
1. Introduction 
The year 2015 will likely go down in history as a crucial test for the European Union (EU). The number 
of refugees entering EU countries was unprecedented in modern history and revealed major flaws in 
the implementation of EU institutional mechanisms to handle a humanitarian crisis of such magnitude. 
Within this debate, lines have been blurred between humanitarian obligations towards asylum 
seekers, their social impact on host countries and the economic opportunities they present. The 
commingling of these questions has caused public confusion and an instrumentalisation of asylum 
seekers across the entire political spectrum. While humanitarian duties are arguably the most 
important element of the debate, economic and social outcomes are aspects where analysts may 
contribute in a useful way. 
Efforts have therefore been made recently to consolidate findings and draw up best practices for the 
economic integration of refugees. These guidelines usually emphasise three major issues: first, long-
term follow-up studies on refugee integration policies are sparse. The reason is almost exclusively the 
lack of tracking and therefore, no micro-data are available.1 Second, even rigorous studies on the 
economic integration of refugees do not often capture more than a single outcome in a particular 
institutional or social setting that has to be interpreted in its historical context. Causal inference and 
transferability to other refugee crises and recipient countries are therefore difficult, and policy 
implications should be treated with care. Finally, due to their irregular occurrence and the largely 
anecdotal nature of evidence on refugee experiences in the Western world, present debates tend to 
start from scratch, largely ignoring historical lessons.  
In this case study, we make an attempt to address the shortcomings outlined above. We revisit one 
particular group of refugees: Bosnians who were displaced during the Bosnian war in the early 1990s. 
We select five Western European countries – namely Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden – that experienced a large influx of Bosnian refugees and that showed similarities regarding 
                                                          
* The authors are (or were at the time of writing this report) researchers at CEPS. Correspondence may be 
addressed to: Lars Ludolph (lars.ludolph@ceps.eu). The authors thank the participants at the “Migration and the 
European Welfare States” conference in Malmö, 19-21 October 2016, Alessandra Venturini and Tobias Stöhr for 
helpful suggestions and comments. Kasper Skaaning provided excellent research assistance. The authors are 
responsible for all errors and omissions. 
1 This problem has recently found its way into the political debate. See for example the studies commissioned by 
the European Parliament (2016) and Bertelsmann (2016). Studies using longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional 
data often focus on the impact that immigrants have on natives. See Foged and Perri (2015) and Borjas and 
Monras (2016) for recent examples.  
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their institutional structures, as well as their level of economic development at the time. In this way, 
the success of integrating refugees into labour markets could be studied comparatively.2  
Data on Bosnian refugees are not available in a structured database. For this reason, we utilise 
available national language sources in addition to international academic publications to study 
integration experiences. Our primary focus lies in the integration of Bosnians into domestic labour 
markets, in the short, medium and longer term perspective. Particular attention is paid to the initial 
integration conditions: access to the labour market and general labour market conditions measured 
by the unemployment rate. We further devote attention to how Bosnian refugees and their 
descendants have fared in educational systems vis-à-vis native and other immigrants. We believe that 
these experiences from the past offer useful lessons for those attempting to understand and cope with 
the current refugee crisis provoked by the Syrian civil war. The latest evidence from Germany suggests 
a relatively high level of education among Syrian refugees compared to other refugee groups, which is 
a feature Syrians share with Bosnians displaced in the early 1990s (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, 2016).  
Our findings are manifold. Host countries differed significantly in the hospitality initially extended 
towards Bosnians. For example, Germany never intended to host Bosnians permanently, made no 
effort to integrate refugees into labour markets and started to repatriate them as soon as the war 
ended. At the other end of the spectrum, Sweden granted the majority of refugees permanent 
residency soon after their arrival. All other countries fall in between these extremes. Labour market 
integration of Bosnian refugees differs substantially between the various recipient countries. In 
Austria, where refugees gained relatively rapid access to the labour market and where labour market 
conditions were favourable upon arrival, labour force participation and employment rates of Bosnians 
quickly converged to those of Austrian natives. Bosnians in Sweden took longer to integrate into the 
labour market, most likely as a consequence of adverse general labour market conditions in Sweden 
at the time of their arrival. In Denmark, where the government was slow to grant the right to work, 
Bosnian refugees still perform significantly worse in labour markets than Danish natives. The sparse 
evidence from the Netherlands indicates that the initial conditions facing Bosnian refugees and their 
later labour market performance overall fall in between the other countries studied. We thus find an 
association of labour market outcomes with the early integration experience and initial labour market 
conditions. On the other hand, the educational level of Bosnian refugees on arrival seems not to be 
associated with medium and long-term labour market outcomes. Finally, second generation Bosnian 
refugees, who were displaced at a young age, perform on a par with the native population regarding 
both employment and educational attainment independent of their parents integration into the labour 
market. By these metrics, integration of Bosnians is a success.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 lay out the historical context. 
Section 4 provides details on the legal procedures and institutional settings that Bosnian refugees 
faced when arriving in the various host countries. Section 5 then turns to labour market outcomes and 
the educational attainment of Bosnians and their descendants. Section 6 concludes.   
                                                          
2 Algan et al. (2009) are among the few authors we are aware of that take a similar approach to compare 
economic outcomes of different immigrant groups in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
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2. Historical background  
The Bosnian war between the different ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place from April 
1992 until the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. Following the breakup of former Yugoslavia, 
Bosnian Serbs rejected the referendum vote in favour of the country’s independence from Yugoslavia. 
Ethnic cleansing against Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats quickly led to a full-scale war. 
Zwierzchowski and Tabeau (2010) estimate the number of total fatalities and missing people at a 
minimum of 89,186 or 2% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 1991 population. Bosniaks suffered the most, 
with casualties and missing persons estimated at 57,992 or 3.1% of their overall population. About 1 
million people were displaced internally and about 1.2 million fled the country as war refugees (Valenta 
and Strabac, 2013).    
Due to ethnic and geographical proximity, about half of these displaced Bosnians took refuge in Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Croatia. The vast majority of the other half, consisting largely of Muslim Bosniaks, 
fled to Western European countries (Table 1). 
Of the five countries analysed in this paper, Germany took in by far the largest number of Bosnians. 
Due to the significant differences in population size, absolute numbers do not reflect the whole picture. 
Table 1 shows registered refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war years in absolute terms 
and as a share of each host country’s population.    
Table 1. Overview of registered refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-95 
Receiving country Number of registered refugees 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Number of refugees from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as a share of host 
country’s population 
Germany 320,000 0.4% 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
297,000 2.9% 
Croatia 170,000 3.6% 
Austria 86,500 1.1% 
Sweden 58,700 0.7% 
Switzerland 24,500 0.4% 
The Netherlands 22,000 0.1% 
Denmark 17,000 0.3% 
Data sources: Valenta and Ramet (2011) and the OECD population database; population data from 1992. 
 
In relative terms, Austria thus bore by far the heaviest burden. Geographical proximity may partly be 
responsible for the destination choices among Bosnians, but there is clearly no linear relationship 
between physical distance and the number of refugees taken in by individual host countries. 
Researchers relying on aggregate statistics in conducting follow-up studies on displaced Bosnians have 
to be careful to distinguish between both forced and voluntary repatriation. The table below shows 
changes in the sample of Bosnian refugees in the aftermath of the Bosnian war.     
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Table 2. Outflows of Bosnians from their country of reception and stock of Bosnian refugees, 2005 
Host country (1992-95) Moved to different 
country of reception 
Repatriation to 
Bosnia (1996-2005) 
Number of (former) 
Bosnian refugees 
remaining in 2005 
Austria 5,500 10,100 70,900 
Denmark - 1,600 15,400 
Germany  52,000 24,6000 22,000 
The Netherlands 2,000 4,000 16,000 
Sweden - 1,900 56,000 
Data source: Elaboration based on Valenta and Ramet (2011). 
The table reveals that Germany repatriated most Bosnian refugees in the aftermath of the Dayton 
Agreement. In all other host countries within our sample, repatriation was voluntary and only a small 
share of Bosnian refugees chose to return to their origin in the decade following the end of the war. 
While it should be kept in mind that there can be large changes within samples of refugees due to 
return migration and repatriation over the years, this does not pose a problem in assessing the 
remaining refugees’ situations within the receiving countries. Additional questions of interest to policy-
makers are why refugees choose to leave the host country and whether there are compositional 
differences regarding their socio-economic characteristics vis-à-vis those who remain in the country. 
The collection of detailed micro-level data would be necessary to answer these questions. 
In all of these countries – with the exception of the Netherlands – refugees entered countries where 
the number of refugees (in the wider definition of the term) was above 0.5% of the total population, 
even before the forced migration caused by the war in former Yugoslavia (Figure 1 below). Thus, 
Western European host countries had experience with handling a relatively large stock of refugees, for 
at least the preceding decade.  
Figure 1. Refugees, asylum-seekers and others of concern in the five host countries 
 
Data source: Authors’ elaboration based on UNHCR and OECD data. 
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The choice of host countries among refugees is less well studied than the pull factors of economic 
migration. However, the research conducted on refugees’ destination decisions emphasises factors 
similar to those that determine the choice of host countries among economic migrants. Existing 
networks, usually defined as the presence of a diaspora, and geographical proximity to the sending 
country are the primary determinants of choice of refuge (Neumayer, 2004; Moore and Shellman, 
2007).   
The two factors above turn out to be highly correlated with the absolute refugee intake, and we infer 
–in the absence of the substantiating modelling – that they are also likely to be the causal determinants 
for the destination choices of Bosnians displaced by the Bosnian war.  
Bosnians have longstanding historical ties with most countries within our sample. In Austria, this dates 
back to 1878, when Bosnia was occupied under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1966, these ties were 
strengthened when Austria recruited a large number of guest workers from former Yugoslavia. By 
1971, more than 93,000 citizens from Yugoslavia lived in Austria (Medien Servicestelle, 2014). A similar 
picture emerges in Germany, where guest workers entered the country mostly in the late 1960s. These 
former guest workers actively drew in refugees during the war years (Valenta and Strabac, 2013). In 
the Netherlands, the number of former Yugoslavs was slightly smaller before the war broke out, but 
still non-negligible. Based on van den Maagdenberg (2004), we estimate their number to be around 
15,000. Denmark hosted approximately 10,000 Yugoslavian immigrants before the war started. 
Sweden experienced a large influx of Yugoslav immigrants between 1940 and 1970, mainly driven by 
economic and labour market opportunities in the manufacturing industry. As these opportunities died 
out, many of these workers emigrated. Very few Yugoslavs, among whom the number of Bosnians was 
negligible, entered the country in the years preceding the outbreak of the Bosnian war (Statistics 
Sweden). We infer that the number of Bosnians and Yugoslavs more generally was likely to have been 
smaller before the arrival of the first Bosnian war refugees than in other countries. 
National statistical databases often do not disaggregate the countries of former Yugoslavia for the pre-
war years. Recent research by Barthel and Neumayer (2015) shows that refugees do not only draw on 
existing networks between their own country and potential host countries but also utilise ties between 
countries in geographical proximity to the source country and potential destinations. On the one hand, 
it is reasonable to assume that this holds true for Bosnians and former Yugoslavs more generally due 
to their common history. We find no evidence in the literature surveyed that the conflict between the 
different ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina hampered this effect.  
3. Economic and labour market conditions in Europe at the time of the Bosnian war 
The economic environment was unfavourable in all host countries at the time the Bosnian war was 
unfolding. A global recession in the aftermath of the 1987 ‘Black Monday’ stock market crash 
characterised much of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Western European countries experienced sharp 
drops in their economic growth rates (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2. Economic growth rates at the time of the Bosnian war 
 
Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
 
The crisis was accompanied by a rise in unemployment in all five countries (Figure 3). These 
observations are important for two reasons: first, economic variables that are subject to high short-
term volatility, such as productivity growth or unemployment, are not likely to be decisive in refugees’ 
choice of destination (see Neumayer, 2004; Neumayer, 2005; Moore and Shellman, 2007). However, 
they aggravate labour market opportunities at the time of arrival, an issue often exacerbated by 
priority systems.3 Despite the common assertion that fast integration into labour markets is crucial for 
integration into societies, if and how the initial conditions of labour markets contribute to path 
dependencies regarding the medium- to long-term employment prospects of refugees has not been 
well explored.4  
Adverse labour market conditions may also impact the host countries’ hospitality towards refugees, 
especially among workers within low-skilled sectors. This sentiment appears to emerge despite recent 
evidence from the UK, Austria and Denmark showing that an inflow of low-skilled refugees rarely leads 
to a displacement of local workers (Dustmann et al., 2013; Bock-Schappelwein and Huber, 2015; Foged 
and Perri, 2015).5 
                                                          
3 A priority system is an employment protection measure that usually puts temporary residence holders last. For 
example, in Austria, when Bosnian refugees held the legal status of aliens , they could only take up positions that 
could not be filled by Austrians, recognised convention refugees, guest workers, labour migrants with social 
welfare credits or second generation aliens with at least five years of schooling in Austria (van Selm-Thorburn, 
1998). 
4 See European Parliament (2016) for an example of a study that makes this claim. 
5 See also the seminal study by Card (1990) on the US. Card (2001), also for the US, finds a very small negative 
employment effect for low-skilled natives caused by migrants. Borjas (2017) and Borjas and Monras (2016) 
challenge these earlier findings and find that refugee inflows can have a significant impact on the labour market. 
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Figure 3. Unemployment rates at the time of the Bosnian war 
 
Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
Host countries’ economies were thus not conducive to absorbing a large number of refugees. Labour 
market conditions differed across the sample: they were most favourable in Austria, where 
unemployment remained low, and most unfavourable in Sweden, where unemployment rates 
exceeded 10% for the duration of the Bosnian war.  
4. Institutional and legal situation in the five host countries during the time of the 
Bosnian war 
Institutions and legal systems of asylum can be assessed across different dimensions. In order to 
understand medium- to long-term labour market and educational outcomes of displaced Bosnians in 
the various receiving countries, the focus in this section lies on the intended hosting period as well as 
early access to labour markets and education. Intuitively, if host countries decide to grant permanent 
residency and to open their labour markets to refugees shortly after arrival and to support them with 
integration measures, economic and social integration should be eased.  
Initially, Bosnian refugees received temporary protection at the time of their arrival in Western 
European countries. This was mainly a political compromise (Black and Koser, 1999). For host 
countries, it was the only way of dealing with the large influx of refugees without amending their 
asylum systems or overburdening them. The UNHCR had deeper concerns. The organisation wanted 
to push the issue of burden-sharing of refugees across Europe. In fact, discussions at the time bear 
some resemblance to those taking place within the EU today. Temporary protection left the door open 
to involve those Western countries that had not experienced an influx of refugees displaced from 
former Yugoslavia. This strategy turned out to be largely unsuccessful. Concern was also expressed 
about the signal being sent by granting refugees permanent residency upon arrival. It was felt that 
ethnic cleansing should not be indirectly supported by accepting acts of aggression in the Bosnian war 
and simply accepting the displacement of the Bosnian population.   
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Despite this consensus on providing initial temporary refuge, there were vast differences in the legal 
and institutional approach to dealing with the influx of Bosnian refugees. Three broad categories 
emerge within the selected sample of countries.  
1) Initial temporary protection but permanent residency and labour market access granted 
shortly after arrival (Sweden) 
In an emergency measure that was taken in June 1993, the Swedish government granted 42,000 
Bosnian refugees permanent residency in Sweden. For a majority of Bosnians, it was therefore clear 
that they would be allowed to stay in the country long term. Many of the asylum-seekers who were 
granted residency did not even have their individual cases tried (Pozvranovic Frykman, 2012). 
The priority given to Balkan war refugees was also reflected in the refugee quota for 1992-93, which 
was devoted entirely to people from the region.6 In 1993-94, the government extended the refugee 
quota from 1,800 individuals to 6,000, to allow for the legal and rapid intake of refugees from former 
Yugoslavia.   
Refugees with permanent residency gained immediate access to labour markets. During the 1990s, 
Sweden also introduced complementary educational courses for immigrants arriving with a foreign 
diploma. By complementing the degree they already possessed from their home country, they 
increased their chances in the Swedish labour market, and Bosnians made use of this. Employers were 
also given incentives to employ individuals for whom access to the labour market was problematic, 
such as refugees, in the form of a 50% wage subsidy from the National Employment Authority for a 
period of up to six months for all eligible employees who were over the age of 20 and had been 
unemployed for more than a year. Evaluations show that, overall, this initiative has improved labour 
market access for immigrants. Refugees in possession of a residence permit further received a training 
course of 1.5 years, which included Swedish language lessons, complementing education and 
information about the labour market (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2012). 
Bosnians further received social assistance similar to natives, referred to as an “introductory benefit” 
and taken from the pot of government money earmarked as livelihood support. 
Return migration of Bosnians in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement was voluntary for permanent 
residency holders and not a forced repatriation. A number of Swedish volunteer organisations set up 
programmes and projects on the ground in Bosnia to support the return migration of Bosnians. The 
Swedish Migration Board assisted refugees who wanted to return home financially. 
2) Initial temporary asylum with limited access to labour markets, converted into permanent 
residency and full access to labour markets at a later point (the Netherlands, Austria and 
Denmark) 
The Netherlands 
The first refugees from former Yugoslavia who arrived in the Netherlands entered the country on 
tourist visas, joining family and friends who had come to the Netherlands as guest workers in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In 1992, the Benelux countries introduced a visa obligation for Bosnia, making it more 
difficult for refugees to enter the Netherlands.  
                                                          
6 The Swedish refugee quota is an annual quota for the resettlement of refugees who are selected by the Swedish 
Migration Board. These quota refugees enter Sweden with the required documents.   
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For refugees from former Yugoslavia, however, special measures were taken: the refugees were kept 
outside of the asylum procedure as their stay was initially considered temporary. They were regarded 
as ‘displaced persons’ (TROO refugees, tijdelijke regeling opvang ontheemden). Many of these 
refugees were housed in empty army bases and other buildings. The TROO status typically applied to 
refugees whose request to stay in the Netherlands was denied but who could not return to their unsafe 
country of origin. These refugees could apply for asylum and receive a monthly allowance of 445 Dutch 
Guilders (€200) from the Social Services. This status in principle allowed the refugees to stay in the 
Netherlands for three months, during which time the government would examine the situation in their 
country of origin. The status could be extended. 
In 1993, the Dutch government found that this situation could not be maintained and therefore started 
to process asylum requests. The majority of Bosnian refugees received the A-status which is the official 
refugee status as outlined in the UN’s Convention Relating to the status of Refugees. This status 
entitled refugees to permanent residency, family reunification, the right to education, student loans 
and social security benefits. Access to labour markets was thus granted to a large number of refugees 
soon after their arrival. 
Austria  
Before 1991, the county had no specific legal framework for dealing with refugees. In 1993, a large 
influx of Croatian refugees spurred Austria to introduce the concept of temporary residency.  
In the summer of 1993, Austria’s government passed a law that granted temporary residence to all 
Bosnian refugees who had entered the country legally. The law was also applied retroactively to 
Bosnians who had arrived before. 
Bosnians faced two formal limits upon entering Austria’s labour market (van Selm-Thorburn, 1998):  
First, since Bosnians had the legal status of aliens, they could not simply take up jobs in Austria. The 
employment priority system in Austria put its own nationals and recognised convention refugees first, 
guest workers and labour migrants with social welfare credits second, followed by second-generation 
aliens with at least five years of schooling in Austria. Only if no one falling into the above categories 
was available could Bosnian refugees obtain employment.  
Second, Austria also had a quota system in place that did not allow the ratio of self-employed plus 
unemployed foreigners to exceed 8% of the total number of self-employed plus unemployed in Austria. 
In 1995, that meant there were only 262,000 jobs available to foreigners (van Selm-Thorburn, 1998).  
This situation changed in 1995, when Bosnian war refugees were granted work permits. By July 1995, 
23,000 out of 50,000 who received government support were integrated into the labour market. This 
number increased to 60% by the end of 1995 (van Selm-Thorburn, 1998). 
After the Dayton Agreement, forced repatriation was discussed but the idea was abandoned on 
humanitarian grounds. This implicitly meant that temporary protection was converted into permanent 
residency. 
Children of Bosnian refugees were allowed to attend Austrian schools starting in autumn 1992 without 
restrictions. Free transport to and from school was provided. 
Financial support had no legal basis in Austria but the central and local governments set up a care and 
maintenance scheme that granted Bosnian refugees between 1,500 (109 EUR) and 5,000 Austrian 
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Schillings (363 EUR) a month per person, depending on the type of accommodation. Refugees in 
organised accommodation also received 100 Austrian Schillings (7 EUR) each month in pocket money. 
The costs were shared by the Interior Ministry (2/3) and the provinces (1/3). Training programmes for 
Bosnian refugees further included German language courses accessible to anyone and specialised 
vocational training for specific professions. Attempts were also made to train refugees together with 
local unemployed (van Selm-Thorburn, 1998).  
Denmark 
The primary legal basis for Bosnian refugees’ stay in Denmark was the so-called Yugoslav law enacted 
in November 1992 (Vested-Hansen et al. 1999). Apart from provisions related to administrative 
handling of refugees appearing spontaneous at the border, it also included extending invitations to 
people residing in the areas of the former Yugoslavia to temporarily move to Denmark under certain 
conditions. The law gave access to temporary but renewable six-month residence permits. Bosnians 
were thus exempted from the normal asylum process for two years after their arrival in Denmark. 
However, this also meant that the asylum procedure for those arriving was put on hold for two years. 
The temporary residence permit did not include the right to family reunion, although exemptions could 
be granted. 
Yugoslav law was meant to give only temporary residence for a short period. Yugoslav refugees were 
installed in refugee shelters and little effort was made in terms of providing any daily activities. No 
activities were arranged that would aim at integration. Working either for a wage or as a volunteer 
was explicitly prohibited. Children were to be taught in a separate system in the refugee shelters and 
did not follow a Danish curriculum (L933, 1992). 
The law was amended in December 1993 (‘selvaktiveringsmodellen’), when more responsibility in 
managing the camps was delegated to residents and they were allowed to be actively involved in 
humanitarian work.  
A further revision taking effect in June 1994 (‘vilkaarsforbedringerne’) gave temporary residence 
holders the right to work. A major limitation, however, was the condition that only job openings that 
had been advertised for a period of three months or more without a suitable Danish applicants were 
eligible. Children were allowed to attend the Danish school system.  
Another change was the possibility of subsidised repatriation. The repatriation programme covered 
transport (including extra baggage), plus a small amount to cover other costs related to the move back 
to Yugoslavia. In the period 1994-2000, around 1,500 people were repatriated, with the bulk of 
repatriations taking place in 1996 and 1997 (Ankestyrelsen, 2014). 
Even though it included a repatriation programme, the 1994 revision marked a change in attitude 
among actors, from a focus on temporary status to one on integration (Schwartz, 1998; Berg, 2002).   
At the end of 1994, the first two-year ‘holding’ period with respect to asylum applications for refugees 
from Yugoslavia began to expire, and during 1995 more than 16,000 people from the former Yugoslavia 
received asylum. A further 1,100 people were granted asylum in 1996 (Indenrigsministeriet, 1997). 
This meant access to the regular integration programme, the education system, social assistance and 
the labour market, as well as accommodation outside the refugee camps.     
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Similar to the situation in Austria, a large share of the Bosnian refugees – those who arrived in 1992 
and 1993 – waited two years or more before any substantial integration or language courses were 
offered to them.  
3) Temporary protection with very limited access to labour markets (Germany) 
Germany took in the largest number of Bosnian refugees in absolute terms. At the outset, Germany 
had a welcoming asylum-seeker system, where refugees were given time to stay in the country until 
their status was cleared. Accommodation and maintenance were provided for. Several factors 
contributed to domestic unease towards the high inflow of refugees and migrants. The country already 
faced a large inflow from Eastern Europe while German Reunification triggered internal East-West 
migration (Fassmann et al., 1999). In the context of low economic growth rates and rising 
unemployment rates from 4.8% to 7.9% between 1990 and 1993, attitudes towards refugees grew 
more critical. 
Consequently, Article 16 of the German Grundgesetz (the German de facto constitution) was amended 
in 1993, making it more difficult for refugees who had passed through other safe member states of the 
European community to obtain refugee status in Germany.  
Within this context, §54 AuslG was applied to Bosnian war refugees instead of the usual §32a AuslG, 
which had been established for civil war refugees shortly before – the latter was not implemented 
since the allocation of costs between the federal state and Bundesländer was not agreed upon (FES, 
2002). This meant that Germany agreed to share a burden of Bosnian refugees and tolerated them 
temporarily as “de-facto-Flüchtlinge” (Temporary Protected Status). They were granted an exceptional 
status since repatriation was not feasible, and thus they were mostly prevented from entering the 
regular asylum-seeker system (Birsl, 2003). In other words, the temporary protection status enabled 
non-ordinary refugees from Bosnia to remain in Germany until it was considered safe to return home 
but they were never offered the prospect of a long-term stay. 
Access to the German labour market for refugees was severely limited by legislation. As in other 
countries, refugees had to pass a so-called ‘Vorrangprüfung’, a priority system that puts German 
nationals and permanent residence holders first. Refusal of repatriation automatically led to a 
permanent ban from the country’s labour markets. 
This priority system was tightened further in 1993, where potential employers had to demonstrate 
that they had tried but were unsuccessful in attracting a German national as a candidate for a position, 
even when recruiting in other regions and branches. 
Only years later was the legislation softened, at which point most Bosnian refugees had already been 
repatriated. After the reform, the temporary right of residence entailed a 9-12 month ban from 
employment, followed by an assessment of labour market suitability after which temporary access to 
labour markets could be granted (Flüchtlingsrat BW, 2014).  
Moreover, an apprenticeship could only be taken by a refugee after the aforementioned priority check 
and if the refugee was predicted to maintain his/her status and had sufficient (non-public) financial 
means to support himself/herself for the duration of the apprenticeship (Behrensen and Groß, 2004). 
Ultimately, very few de facto refugees from Bosnia found access to the German labour market; for 
example only 1-2% in Berlin obtained a work permit (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2002). Special integration 
measures were not implemented on a federal level and access to the existing support systems in the 
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form of language courses, vocational training measures and upgrade training were not granted due to 
their special refugee status (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2002). 
Bosnian refugees were entitled to the same social assistance as the long-term unemployed in Germany 
at the time. When repatriation started, rates were cut to 80% of the full amount (Hammerling and 
Schwarz, 2003). In some cases, the German high court overruled this practice (Anker, 1997). Social 
assistance was provided in the form of cash, rent coverage (residential accommodation) and other 
means. De facto refugees also had access to health insurance (Classen, 2013).  
Table 3 below summarises the institutional and legal framework in the five host countries. The lighter 
the colours, the more favourable our assessment of the starting conditions. 
Table 3. Overview of the institutional and legal framework in the five host countries 
  Type of residency 
granted 
Access to labour 
market and 
education 
Integration 
measures 
Financial support 
  
Germany 
Temporary with 
forced repatriation 
once the Bosnian war 
ended 
Limited: refugees last 
in priority system; 
unlimited only after 4 
years of employment 
or 1 year of training 
No or very limited 
access due to their 
special status 
Social assistance 
similar to natives 
  
Denmark 
 
Short-term 
temporary residency 
(6 months, 
renewable) initially; 
converted into 
permanent asylum 
for most refugees 
throughout 1995 
Very limited: ro initial 
labour market 
access, then subject 
to priority system. 
Full access only with 
asylum status 
granted in 1995; 
children exempt from 
regular school 
system until June 
1994 
Very few initially, 
integration measures 
only introduced in 
1995 
Only provisional 
accommodation in 
refugee camps 
initially; access to 
social assistance only 
from 1995 
  
 
Austria 
Initially temporary, 
implicitly converted 
into permanent 
residency right after 
the Dayton 
Agreement. No 
forced repatriation 
Limited until 1995, 
then unlimited. 
Access to education 
for children from 
time of arrival 
Language and 
vocational training as 
well as measures to 
promote social 
integration 
Funds for 
accommodation and 
small sums for pocket 
money 
 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Initially temporary 
but as early as 1993 
most Bosnians 
received refugee 
status and thus 
permanent residency 
Little to no access to 
labour markets while 
asylum procedure 
ongoing; 
Full access to labour 
markets and 
education granted 
once refugee status 
was obtained 
Very few initially with 
participation in 
language and 
integration courses 
on a voluntary basis 
first, stricter later on 
Provisional 
accommodation 
initially; 445 Dutch 
Guilders monthly from 
social services; after 
1993, full access to 
social security benefits 
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5. Medium and long-term labour market and educational outcomes of Bosnians in the 
five receiving countries 
The picture that emerges of Bosnian refugees’ experiences in the different host countries is far from 
homogeneous. The lack of available data with the specific purpose of following up on the economic 
integration of permanently displaced Bosnians proves a serious obstacle to causal inference. National 
statistical databases and labour force surveys often do not disaggregate data on former Yugoslav 
nationals. We will show below that this may lead to fallacies and false judgments regarding labour 
market outcomes in some countries. A further caveat to following up on Bosnian refugees is the lack 
of distinction in national databases between refugees and economic and family migrants. These groups 
of immigrants are known to differ significantly with respect to their success in labour markets and 
within educational systems. Aggregating them, in particular when the composition can only be 
estimated roughly, complicates analyses. The issue is again exacerbated by the practice of aggregating 
data to the level of former Yugoslavs. 
For the reasons outlined above, we note that great care has to be applied when interpreting labour 
market outcomes and educational attainments of Bosnian refugees and their descendants. We 
attempt to overcome these weaknesses by utilising all available national and European-level resources 
and deriving some conclusions by comparison.  
We first turn to labour market outcomes shortly after the end of the Bosnian war. The timeline of the 
wars in former Yugoslavia and the comparisons of the total number of Yugoslav refugees with those 
from Bosnia lead us to assume that identifying Yugoslav immigrants who entered host countries from 
1993 onwards reasonably captures Bosnian war refugees. Figure 4 below shows labour market 
participation rates in the different receiving countries of this group in 1998. 
We exclude Germany from all further analyses, as it never intended to integrate Bosnian war refugees 
from the beginning. Furthermore, almost all Bosnian refugees were repatriated from Germany.  
It is striking that in Austria more than 70% of all Yugoslav immigrants from the war years had joined 
the labour force by 1998. In Sweden, where they encountered the highest level of support, labour 
force participation stood at 57%, which is significantly below Swedish nationals and more than veteran 
immigrants but still ahead of Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
  
Sweden 
Initially temporary 
residency. In June 
1993, most Bosnian 
refugees were 
granted permanent 
residency 
Unrestricted labour 
market access since 
June 1993; 
unrestricted access 
to education 
Permanent residency 
automatically 
entitled to language 
and training courses; 
subsidized 
employment for 
refugees eased 
entering labour 
markets 
Social assistance 
similar to natives 
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Figure 4. Labour force participation of former Yugoslav nationals in 1998 in various host countries 
 
Data sources: Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Eurostat Labour Force Survey. 
Employment-to-population ratios displayed in Figure 5, below, again show a very positive picture of 
the labour market outcomes experienced by former Yugoslav nationals in Austria, where this number 
had already reached 64% for recent immigrants in 1998. In all other countries of our sample, these 
employment rates remained subdued, between 26% (the Netherlands) and 32% (Sweden). 
Figure 5. Employment rate of former Yugoslav nationals in 1998 in various host countries 
 
Data sources: Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Eurostat Labour Force Survey. 
Turning to the medium-term outcomes gives a much more positive picture, as shown in Figure 6 
below.    
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Figure 6. Labour force participation of Bosnians in various countries 
 
Data sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistik Austria, van den Maagdenberg (2004) and Eurostat. 
There is a clear convergence trend between Bosnians and nationals in these countries. By 2008, 
Bosnians participated in the labour force in larger relative numbers than Austrian nationals. Similar 
catch-up dynamics can be observed in the Netherlands (2004 data) and Denmark (2002 data).  
Directly comparable labour force participation data from Sweden for the medium term are not 
available. However, Bevelander and Lundh (2007), based on Statistics Sweden, find employment rates 
of about 68% for Bosnian immigrants in 2003. This number is significantly above the 1998 value and 
that for other immigrants in Sweden, but it is still lower than employment rates among Swedish 
nationals (84%). 
Unemployment rates for the same years are shown in Figure 7 below.  
Figure 7. Unemployment rates of Bosnians in the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria, 2002-08 
 
Data sources: van den Maagdenberg (2004), Danmarks Statistik (2002), Statistik Austria (2008) and Eurostat. 
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Austria again shows the most positive results. Relative unemployment among Bosnians is only 
marginally above that of Austrian nationals. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the difference in 
unemployment between Bosnians and Danish and Dutch nationals was still high, with 8.4 percentage 
points (Denmark, 2002) and 11.3 percentage points (Netherlands, 2004) respectively. 
The most recent numbers from Denmark and Austria indicate that long-term labour market 
participation differs little from the medium-term results shown above (see Figure 8 below).  
Figure 8. Labour force participation of Bosnians in Denmark and Austria, 2013-14 
 
Data sources: Danmarks Statistik (2014) and own calculations based on Statistik Austria (2014). 
The crisis years might have affected participation rates of Bosnians slightly more than those of the 
native population. We argue below that this could be the result of the skill composition among 
Bosnians vis-à-vis the Austrian native population.  
However, Bosnians still participate in labour markets in slightly higher relative numbers than native 
Austrians. Those who are part of the labour force perform on a par with the national populations on 
unemployment rates two decades after the end of the Bosnian war (Figure 9 below). 
Figure 9. Unemployment rates of Bosnians in Denmark and Austria  
 
Data sources: Ankestyrelsen (2014), Statistik Austria (2014) and Eurostat. 
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These findings are highly heterogeneous across age groups. Figure 10 below displays the employment 
rates of 25-64 year olds residing in Denmark for more than 15 years in 2013.  
Figure 10. Employment rates of Bosnians, ethnic Danes and non-western immigrants (25-64 years), 
2013 
 
Data source: Ankestyrelsen (2014). 
Employment rates are shown for ethnic Danes, Bosnian immigrants and non-Western immigrants. 
Bosnians do better than other non-Western immigrants for the age group 24-39 years old, but the 
relative decline in performance is steep. For both immigrant groups, the employment rate is 54% for 
40-49-year olds, whereas for 50-64-year old, Bosnians are lagging behind non-Western immigrants by 
more than 10 percentage points. There is no difference when looking at gender-specific rates, except 
that men tend to have a higher employment rate than women for all age groups. 
This is a first indication that those Bosnians who came to Denmark in their early years tend to do well. 
This is further corroborated by looking at NEETs (not in employment, education, or training) for 20-24 
year olds. These are the youngest Bosnians arriving in 1993-95. NEET rates for Bosnians are very similar 
to those for ethnic Danes and much lower than for immigrants with a non-Western background. 
The decline in performance relative to non-Western immigrants with age could be a length-of-stay 
effect. Differences in education may be another potentially important difference, although this would 
likely widen the gap. One would have to look at micro data to disentangle such effects.  
We find similar evidence in Sweden. There is no marked difference in the employment rate of children 
born to Bosnian migrants compared to children born to Swedes, suggesting that there is no 
continuation of intra-generational inequality in labour market participation for this particular migrant 
group (Hammarstedt, 2015). Children of Bosnian parents fare better than other second-generation 
immigrants: the employment rate of the latter group stood at 73% in 2014 compared to the Swedish 
national average of 83.1% (Statistics Sweden, 2014). 
In addition to these stark generational differences, it is also noteworthy that there is large 
heterogeneity within the group of former Yugoslavs regarding their labour market outcomes. In 
Austria, e.g. employment rates differed significantly between Bosnians (71.5%) and Serbs (55%).  
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We now turn to the educational attainment of Bosnians in the respective host countries (Figure 11).  
Figure 11. Educational attainment of Bosnians in various host countries 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on Statistics Sweden (2015), Biffl et al. (2011), Hessels (2005), Bonke and Schultz-
Nielsen (2013) and Eurostat data. 
Surprisingly, Bosnians in Austria are on average less well educated than Bosnians in Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands vis-à-vis the respective native population.7 Neither vast differences in native 
educational attainment nor the classification of education are the causal driver of this finding 
(Eurostat).8 It is thus highly unlikely that the more successful integration of Bosnians into labour 
markets in Austria compared to other countries was caused by the higher level of education in the 
sample of Bosnians seeking refuge in Austria. The most recent research by the OECD (2016) indicates 
that country effects have a strong and significant influence on employment rates among refugees while 
education only has a marginal effect. Our findings on Bosnians are in line with these results. 
Disentangling the causes behind these unexplained country effects is, in our view, fertile ground for 
further research. 
One possible explanation for the lack of correlation between educational attainment and labour 
market outcomes can be found in the often-cited narrative of overqualified refugees (see for example 
OECD, 2016 or Joona et al., 2014 and Nielsen, 2011) for immigrants and refugees in Sweden and 
Denmark respectively). If refugees mostly take up jobs below their skill level and if this holds 
particularly true for relatively well-educated refugees, the importance of education for labour market 
outcomes is severely diminished.  
We find evidence for overqualified Bosnian refugees in most countries of our sample. For example, 
Halilovich (2013) reports in a qualitative study on Bosnians in Austria that many of them “work in 
                                                          
7 See the Appendix for the educational attainment of Bosnians by country.   
8 Low level of education captures levels 1 and 2 of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), 
medium education corresponds to levels 3 and 4. High level of education are individuals falling into categories 5 
and 6 of the ISCED. We approximate the educational attainment of Bosnians in the Netherlands by the group of 
former Yugoslavs. The numbers displayed should provide a lower bound for their mean level of education: Across 
the sample, we find Bosnians to be slightly better educated than the group of former Yugoslavs as a whole. 
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underpaid jobs for which they are usually overqualified” (p. 533). In Sweden, 33.3% of foreign-born 
nationals report that they feel overqualified for their profession. For Swedish-born nationals, this 
figure is significantly lower at 17.3% (Statistics Sweden, 2014). Evidence from the Netherlands further 
suggests that many Bosnians did not have access to the occupations that they were qualified for in 
Bosnia as Dutch employers did not recognise their degrees. This led some Bosnians to accept 
employment for which they were overqualified. Most of them, however, decided to pursue additional 
training or followed language courses in an attempt to overcome the issue (Bolwijn and De Mooij, 
2015). 
Evidence from Denmark shows a positive picture of young Bosnians’ educational attainment (Figure 
12).    
Figure 12. Share of 20-24 year olds pursuing further education by gender in Denmark, 2012-13 
 
Data source: Ankestyrelsen (2014). 
Within the age group of 20 to 24 year olds, both female and male Bosnians are enrolled in further 
secondary and tertiary education significantly more often than Danish nationals and non-Western 
immigrants. This evidence suggests that second-generation Bosnians and Bosnians who immigrated 
into Denmark early in their lives fare very well in the Danish educational system. A similar picture 
emerges in the Netherlands, where over 40% of children to Bosnian refugees obtained a university 
degree or a university college degree, a number above the national average (Bolwijn and De Mooij, 
2015). According to de Boom et al. (2008), 54.9% of the former Yugoslavs aged 15-24 were enrolled in 
full-time education in 2007, which is on a par with the Dutch nationals. Hessels (2005) reports that 
children outperform their parents in terms of educational attainment and most of them follow higher 
education. 
A further factor potentially leading to adverse labour market outcomes is discrimination by employers 
against Bosnian immigrants. We only find weak evidence for this hypothesis. Evidence from the 
Netherlands suggests that cultural proximity of Bosnians to Western Europeans has a positive impact 
on their employment opportunities. Van den Maagdenberg (2004) finds that Bosnians face much less 
discrimination than other immigrant groups such as Turks and Moroccans. On the contrary, a recent 
experimental study by Weichselbaumer (2015) finds that callback rates are significantly lower for 
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Serbian applicants compared to national Austrians and German immigrants in Austria, but higher than 
for other migrant groups. We do not find similar evidence from the other countries in our sample but 
conclude that discrimination against Bosnians, while present, is likely to be less severe than 
discrimination against other migrant groups. 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
The evidence above presented is of course fragmented and only allows us to point to correlations 
rather than establishing causality between the initial conditions refugees faced, their socio-economic 
characteristics and labour market outcomes. However, a number of interesting points emerge due to 
the stark differences across the countries we selected.  
Germany never intended to host Bosnians permanently, made no efforts to integrate refugees into 
labour markets and started to repatriate them as soon as the war ended. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Sweden granted refugees permanent residency soon after arrival. The other countries fall 
in between.  
Labour market outcomes of Bosnian refugees also show great heterogeneity across all countries. 
Bosnians in Austria were already indistinguishable from natives regarding their labour market 
outcomes 13 years after the large influx of refugees. From the start they performed better than 
Bosnian refugees in other countries of our sample. The level of education seems not to have been the 
decisive factor for their successful integration. More generally, we do not find a noteworthy 
association between educational attainment of Bosnians at the macro level and their labour market 
outcomes across the selected host countries. 
A key question, which is closely linked to today’s political debate , is whether there is any link between 
initial efforts to integrate refugees and their short-term, medium-term and long-term labour-market 
outcomes. We find a correlation between labour-market outcomes of Bosnians displaced in the early 
1990s and our initial ranking of host countries’ hospitality towards refugees. Evidence of Bosnians from 
Austria and the Netherlands and from Sweden show much more favourable labour-market outcomes 
than in Denmark, the country where refugees faced a rather non-integrative environment in the 
beginning. The magnitude of this head-start effect is, however, hard to quantify. Implicitly, these 
results are in line with latest OECD (2016) research. When controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics, most of the explanatory power on refugee integration stems from country effects. 
More research on the decisive factors is thus needed. Simply looking at the various labour market 
integration measures from a macroeconomic perspective, for example by public expenditure targeted 
at them, while ignoring their quality, might be insufficient.  
We note that the head-start effect might have been severely hampered by adverse labour market 
conditions in some countries at the time of the Bosnian refugees’ arrival. For example, unemployment 
in Sweden exceeded 10% in 1993, while this number stood at roughly 4% in Austria. This could be a 
reason why it took Bosnians more time to integrate into labour markets in Sweden than in Austria. We 
further note that refugees themselves are likely to underestimate the importance of business cycles 
for their integration success. 
The sample of Bosnian refugees remained relatively stable over the past two decades in four out of 
the five countries we examined in this study. However, there are sources for potential bias when 
equating Bosnian refugees with Bosnians. Network effects drew in more Bosnians after the war ended 
– an effect of small yet non-negligible magnitude in all countries under consideration. A self-selection 
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bias occurs in countries where repatriation was voluntary. Presumably, refugees who returned to their 
home countries were less likely to have settled successfully into life in their host countries, making 
labour market outcomes of the remaining sample appear more favourable. For example, evidence 
from the Netherlands suggests that older refugees with difficulties to integrate into labour markets 
returned to Bosnia more often (Brink, 1996). 
The case of Germany shows that temporary protection without integration efforts provides a valid 
policy tool. Following up on Bosnian return migrants and their economic outcomes in the aftermath of 
repatriation could be another interesting benchmark against which to measure Bosnian refugees’ 
performance in recipient countries.  
Altogether, these findings emphasise the need for more detailed micro-level data to disentangle other 
drivers of employment of refugees from the success of integration measures. 
Evidence from Denmark and the Netherlands indicate educational attainments of young and second-
generation Bosnians that are on a par with or even exceed those of the respective native population. 
Thus, the lower educational attainment of first-generation Bosnian refugees compared to natives 
appears to converge to (and even exceed in some cases) the levels of the native-born population within 
one generation. This is exceptionally fast and it is well worth following up on the determinants of these 
positive outcomes, particularly because such a catch-up is not found for other immigrant groups. More 
time is needed to assess if these educational achievements translate into employment rates. Initial 
results suggest that integration of young and second-generation Bosnians is completed successfully, 
as measured by their education.  
We believe that these findings have implications for Syrians displaced by the civil war in their country. 
Initial assessments of their educational level in Germany show that 27% of new arrivals were enrolled 
in or had completed tertiary education before fleeing the country. This number is significantly lower 
for refugees entering Western European countries on average (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, 2016). As noted above, other factors will likely determine their initial success in the labour 
markets; however, if dynamics are similar to those experienced with Bosnian refugees in the early 
1990s, the educational attainment of young and second-generation Syrians could converge quickly to 
the level found among the native-born population.     
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Appendix 
Details on the asylum procedure during the time of the Bosnian war 
Bosnian refugees in the Netherlands received one of the following three statuses (Snel et al., 2000): 
1) A-status is the official refugee status as outlined in the UN’s Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. This status entitled refugees to permanent residency, family reunification, the 
right to education, student loans and social security benefits. 
 
2) TVTV status did not entail recognition as a refugee but entitled an individual to a residence 
permit for humanitarian reasons. That status was mostly given to refugees from war zones 
who cannot prove they are individually persecuted. It encompassed a temporary residence 
permit for five years and the same social rights as the A-status. 
 
3) VVTV status was invented for Bosnians. It is a temporary residence permit without formal 
recognition as a refugee but entitled the individual to stay until the situation in the country of 
origin improved. It needs to be renewed every year and is only valid for three years. The VVTV 
status was inferior to the A-status because it offered less security. The VVTV status implies that 
arrivals can be sent back to their country if the situation improves within a period of three 
years. These refugees receive a full allowance from the Social Services (which is not the case 
for those with the TROO status). However, the VVTV status was not easy to obtain as it was 
only granted to those considered ‘privileged’, while those who are underprivileged would not 
be eligible. It entailed less social rights than the two other options: no entitlement to family 
reunification, no access to student loans, limited access to labour market as well as a limited 
allowance and insurance. However, with the war in Bosnia dragging on, the VVTV status was 
often converted into an A-status. 
The table below summarises the asylum procedure. Most Bosnians displaced by the Bosnian war fell 
into the A-status category.  
Table A 1. Decisions about asylum requests from former Yugoslavia, 1985-98 
 Asylum granted Asylum not 
granted 
Total 
 Total A-status VTV VVTV 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
30,892 20,250 3,531 7,109 50,446 81,338 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
24,550 
(60%) 
16,585 
(68%) 
1,166 
(7%) 
6,799 
(25%) 
16,359 
(40%) 
40,909 
Yugoslavian 
Federation 
5,595 
(15%) 
3,454 1,906 233 30,806 
(85%) 
36,401 
Croatia 672 
(32%) 
211 385 76 1,490 
(66%) 
2,162 
Macedonia 73 
(6%) 
0 72 1 1,745 
(94%) 
1,181 
Slovenia 2 
(4%) 
0 2 0 46 
(96%) 
48 
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Educational attainment of Bosnians 
Figure A 1. Educational attainment of Bosnians residing in the respective host countries 
 
Data source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistics Sweden (2015), Biffl et al. (2011), Hessels (2005), Bonke and 
Schultz-Nielsen (2013) and Eurostat data. 
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